tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7084383733126999463.post1722783382122129264..comments2023-05-01T03:17:18.298-07:00Comments on Suicide Treatise: Deontological antinatalismzralytylenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17445359606565469709noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7084383733126999463.post-81451864848261229562011-04-15T06:28:56.914-07:002011-04-15T06:28:56.914-07:00>It isn't the case that they can't prov...>It isn't the case that they can't provide consent just because we can't ask them, they can't provide consent because they don't exist and therefore consent doesn't apply.<br /><br />Many things can't give consent (the mentally disabled, the comatose, animals, etc,) yet we don't consider this a basis to exclude them from arguments about consent. Rather, we assume that the lack of consent is sufficient grounds such that no antagonistic action should be taken against them. If you wish to argue otherwise you must demonstrate why the hinderance of non-existence in obtaining consent in particular should be treated differently from the others cases.<br /><br />>Point 5 makes it seem as if we could get consent from a non-existent being,<br /><br />It doesn't assume so nor is it required for my purposes. All that's needed is that consent must be obtained in any instance of non-wrongful killing.<br /><br />>That right comes only with the process of birth, and thus cannot apply to times before birth.<br /><br />See my post here http://suicidetreatise.blogspot.com/2011/01/on-non-identity-problem.html that addresses this issue.<br /><br />>And I fail to see how arguments from hedonism are necessarily weak in the way you seem to imply.<br /><br />Benatar's position materialises out of a harm-centric considerations which can be countered out of pleasure-centric considerations. If you present the pleasure-pain asymmetry to someone, they can (and almost always do) argue that pleasure of life can override the pain and thus discussion stagnates as it devolves in analyses of pleasure-harm metrics. Deontological arguments such as the one I gave hold less wiggle room for subjectivity as it rests upon the same founding as the legal system.zralytylenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445359606565469709noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7084383733126999463.post-79837649426797320512011-04-14T06:39:52.870-07:002011-04-14T06:39:52.870-07:00Points 4 and 5 cannot work together. Point 4 is t...Points 4 and 5 cannot work together. Point 4 is the obvious point that a non-existent being cannot provide consent, but you have to be very particular when making that point. It isn't the case that they can't provide consent just because we can't ask them, they can't provide consent because they don't exist and therefore consent doesn't apply. Point 5 makes it seem as if we could get consent from a non-existent being, it is just the case that we don't. But, that isn't true. Death does necessarily follow from birth, but because before birth a being is a non-entity and thus incapable of having any claim on the duties of others, the case cannot be made that somehow the right of consent has been violated. That right comes only with the process of birth, and thus cannot apply to times before birth. This whole issue of antinatalism is a tricky one, and I think you has better reconsidered some of Benatar's arguments. He is much more clever than you give him credit for. His asymmetry argument avoids the problems of having to deal positively with the absurdity of a non-existent being. And I fail to see how arguments from hedonism are necessarily weak in the way you seem to imply. Hedonism probably has the most real world support in the areas of biology and psychology. It seems to at least be the basis for primitive morals.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com